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PERFORMING THE CONSTITUTION
DENs J. BION*
Umberto Eco's novel, Foucault's Pendulum,' is a tale of three minor
figures in the publishing field who become aware of a widespread belief
among the fringe elements of Western society that a secret and globally
portentous Plan has been unfolding for several centuries. These fringe
elements are obsessed, finding hidden evidence of The Plan in a variety of
texts, some of them seemingly quite innocuous. The novel's protagonists
decide, at least partly out of whimsy, that they themselves would read even
more prosaic texts as holding similar evidence.
In their tour de force, they triumphantly interpret a humble driver's
manual as saying that the automobile exists "only to serve as metaphor of
creation." '2 The drive shaft of the automobile is the trunk of the tree of
Belboth. 3 The engine is Omnia Movens, "communicat[ing] its creative energy
to the ... higher wheels: the Wheel of Intelligence and the Wheel of

Knowledge." ' 4 The clutch is "the Sefirah of grace that establishes or interrupts the flow of love that binds the rest of the tree to the Supernal
Energy." ' 5 The "alternation of intake and exhaust... [is a] complex, divine
6
respiration."
My purpose as well is to address the matter of textual interpretation,
more specifically, to make a small and no doubt unnecessary addition to
the already mountainous heap of academic worry over the much-vexed
question: "What is the meaning of the Constitution?" Before you, gentle
reader, become unduly alarmed, however, I do not propose to discuss how
the Commerce Clause fits into the ebb and flow of divine respiration. Nor
will I explore the role of Article Three courts in the function of the cosmic
engine, the Omnia Movens.
Rather, my point of departure is a provocative idea offered by the
prolific and much-awarded English playwright Tom Stoppard on the occasion of an academic lecture. During the question and answer period which
followed the lecture, a member of the audience asked him what his reaction
was when directors staged his plays in ways that obviously got their meaning

* B.S., 1961, Northwestern University; J.D., University of Virginia, 1970; Professor
of Law, Washington & Lee University. The author gratefully acknowledges the able research
assistance of Tanya J. Dobash and Patricia M. Hale.
1. UmBERTO Eco, FoucAuLT's PENDuLM (William Weaver trans., 1989). The author
gratefully acknowledges the suggestion of Tanya J. Dobash that I would find this book well
worth reading.
2. Id. at 378.
3. Id.
4.Id.
5.Id.at 379.
6. Id.
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wrong. Stoppard replied, "Well, actually, I look 7forward to seeing my plays
staged so that I can find out what they mean.''
Implicitly underlying Stoppard's puckish reply is a particular and perhaps idiosyncratic conception of the meaning of a text, in this case, the
script of a play. What I propose to do in this essay is explore this
proposition: What would be the consequences of imputing to the Framers
of the Constitution a conception of its meaning similar to the one that Tom
Stoppard has for his plays-to assume, that is, that the Framers, all skilled
politicians, considered the Constitution to be a performance document, to
be acted out then and in the future within a particular social, economic,
and cultural context, one that would undoubtedly change over time? The
idea is to make moot the question of original intent by positing that the
proper meaning of the Constitution is neither something inherent in the text
itself nor a reconstruction of the Framers' intent, but instead -is
the product
of the performance of the text.
Starting with these "what if" propositions, I propose to explore two
questions. First, I will address in some detail how the Constitution would
come to have meaning. Then, I will explore, though in a considerably more
preliminary way, what consequences this would have for the judicial function
of deciding constitutional questions, a function that is intimately bound up
in the matter of constitutional meaning.
It is clear, of course, that Tom Stoppard's conception of textual meaning
opens himself to having to accept the many different ways in which directors
and actors can stage any one text of a play. Contemporary productions of
Shakespeare's plays exemplify the rich variation that is possible. Particular
roles, for instance, can be cast with an actor or actress of a different raceDenzell Washington cast as Richard III or Morgan Freeman as Petruchio
in The Taming of the Shrew. The temporal or physical setting of the play
is subject to considerable variation-staging As You Like It in Dickensian
costume or The Taming of the Shrew in the American Wild West. The
performers can put a variety of different "spins" on particular characters,
for example, the particular characterization of Richard III that the director
asked of the Richard Dreyfuss character in the film, The Goodbye Girl.
Indeed, as Umberto Eco demonstrates with the driver's manual, the
potential range of possible interpretations to which a text is subject threatens
to be limitlessly broad. This, after all, is one of the powerful messages of
deconstruction-the controversial practice of certain avant garde academicians of taking great pleasure in endlessly standing texts on their heads.
Clearly, Foucault'sPendulum offers a sobering message, one that requires
me to sharpen how I formulate the task of this essay: Given our commitment
to the Rule of Law, how do we "perform the Constitution" without falling
into utter whimsy-or paranoia?

7. Tom Stoppard, The Text and the Event, Lecture at Washington & Lee University
(Dec. 2, 1981).
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In the pages that follow, I will offer particular conceptualizations of
meaning in theatre, in language, and in the judicial function, conceptualizations based not on meaning as an attribute of a text but instead as the
current product of an ongoing process. These conceptualizations do not
command mainstream acceptance; at best, they command only grudging
respect. Each, however, derives from the attempt of seasoned and trenchant
observers to describe pragmatically what goes on in these activities.
Then, I will argue both that these conceptualizations capture how the
Constitution ought to have meaning, and that this approach, though it
eschews the possibility of textual determinacy and fixed meaning, nevertheless remains faithful to the commitment to the Rule of Law. Finally, I will
try to suggest in a preliminary way how this approach to textual meaning
might affect judicial practice; what, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 8 Jerome
Frank, 9 and Karl Llewellyn 0 might say, judges and lawyers "do about the
Constitution."

I.
A.

TExTs

Theatre

The Prague Linguistic Circle, an influential school of structuralist
thought that flourished in the 1920s and 1930s," produced an efflorescence
of theories about theatre and drama.12 Theatre, according to Prague School
theory, is "the complex of phenomena associated with the performeraudience transaction: that is, with the production and communication of
' 3
meaning in the performance itself and with the systems underlying it." '
Drama, by contrast, is "that mode of fiction designed for stage represen4
tation and constructed according to particular ('dramatic') conventions.'"
What is theatrical, according to these definitions, "is limited to what takes
place between and among performers and spectators."' 5 Although the
intellectual ferment of the Prague School was part of the larger structuralist
movement of that era, the concept of theatre that emerged strongly empha-

8. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv.
L. RE v. 457, 461 (1897).
9. Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact (pts. 1-2), 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 761 (1931).
10. "What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself." KARL N.
L EWLLYN, THE B1~mBLE BusH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 12 (1960).

11. See FREDERICK J. NEWMEYER, LINGUIsTc THEORY IN AMERICA: THE FIRST QUARTER
CENTURY OF TRANsFORATiONAL GENERATIvE GRA.mAR 37-38 (1980); JOSEF VAcHEIC, THE
LINGUISTIC SCHOOL OF PRAGUE: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-39 (1966).
12. See KEIR EIws, THE SEmOTICS OF THEATRE AND DRAA 5-19 (1980). For a representative collection of Prague School work on theatre, see SEMoTcs OF ART: PRAGUE SCHOOL
CONrmTRUTIONS (Ladislav Matejka & Irwin R. Titunik eds., 1976).
13. ELAm, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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sized that the genesis of theatrical meaning lay in an interactive process
among principals and audience.
The English director Jonathan Miller, writing with the experience of his
distinguished career, argues that there is no "ideal performance"' 6 -the true
meaning-of a great play because the play seems "capable of an almost
infinite number of alternative performances."'' 7 Alternative performances
are possible because the text of a play is only an enabling document and
not an "identifying document"-one that specifies a single meaning.18 The
text of a play cannot be an identifying document in a technical sense:
Playwrights do not include-and cannot, because of a shortage of
notation-all those details of prosody, inflexion, stress, tempo and
rhythm. A script tells us nothing about the gestures, the stance, the
facial expressions, the dress, the weight, or the grouping or the
movements. So although the text is a necessary condition for the
performance it is by no means a sufficient one. It is short of all
these accessories which are, in a sense, the essence of performance.
The literal act of reading the words of a script does not constitute
a performance. 9
Nor can the text of a play be an identifying document in a cultural
sense:
Confronted by classical works, some of which have survived for
several hundred years, it is easy to forget that the author did not
write them for posterity. Plays, like any other art form, are created
for the artist's contemporaries, which means, to some extent at
least, that certain things are understood without having to be
explained.
...

The play can become mummified by dogma; there is evidence

to show that Chekhov suffered in this way. After his death in 1904,
Chekhov's colleagues at the Moscow Arts Theatre succeeded in
establishing a canonical production of each of his plays. The proprieties were supervised by his widow who extended her vigilance
to the smallest detail. But the style of the company was superseded
by developments in every other area of the European theatre, with
the result that the orthodox production began to look quaint and
even irrelevant. Something comparable happened to Wagner and to
Brecht. 20

16.
Jonathan
Inc..
17.
18.
19.
20.

JONATHAN MILLER, SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCES 33 (1986). Copyright © 1986 by
Miller used by permission of Viking Penguin, a division of Penguin Books USA
Id. at 34.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 48-49.
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Any one production of a play, then, "is inevitably a limited version of
the range of possible interpretations.' '2 According to Miller, what generates
the particular version that is performed are the perceptions which director
and actors bring to the text in order to generate hypotheses about the
possibilities of the text. 22 Moreover, perception is not an objective, neutral
matter:
Perception always approaches its domain with interests, preoccupations and prejudices about what is important in a work whether
of art or literature. If we agreed that the function of the director
is to restore as much of the information of the original performance
as he could, what he would infer as being important about the
original production would not provide a faithful copy of its original
but merely tell us what he thought was important in it. He would
automatically and unavoidably be introducing an interpretation, and
even at his most obedient would introduce preconceptions. I believe
that it is better to be conscious of your preconceptions rather than
simply to be the victim of them. 23
Thus, a production of a play can only be an interpretation, even if the
director sets out to replicate rather than interpret. Moreover, because the
interpretation proceeds from the perceptions of director and actors and
because these perceptions are a function of their values, what is particular
about any production is ideological in nature.
Perhaps paradoxically, however, value-laden interpretation does not
constrain the possibility of meaning; it liberates meaning. As with the
canonical productions of Chekhov's plays, as time passed, the less we would
understand of the original production of a play. Were a play to be frozen
into a canonical production, "the theatre would become rather like a
museum or a church in which the audiences would be subtly changed into
congregations, witnesses of a rite rather than spectators of a play.'"'
Instead, the limitedness of any production can become a virtue:
As long as we recognize and accept the argument that performance
is, necessarily, a limitation, then the destiny of a great play is to
undergo a series of performances each of which is incomplete, and
in some cases may prove misleading and perverse. By submitting
itself to the possibility of successive re-creation, however, the play
passes through the development that is its birthright, and its meaning
begins to be fully appreciated only when it enters a period that I
shall call its afterlife.25

21. Id. at 23.

22. See id.at 43.
23. Id. at 53.
24. Id. at 55.
25. Id. at 23.
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The afterlife is not, however, a process that tends toward a convergence
of meaning. Indeed, we perform great plays, for instance Shakespeare's,
because of the possibility that unforeseen meanings will emerge. 26 Rather,
"it is only by undergoing the consecutive processes of death and reproduction that plays can enjoy the self-renewal without which an afterlife is
inconceivable." 27 Indeed, Miller believes that "it is precisely because subsequent performances ...

are interpretations, rather than copies, that they

have survived." '28 The term "life" connotes growth and change; the afterlife,
then, proceeds as a process of renewal.
Prague School theory, like Jonathan Miller, holds that no one production is exhaustive of the potential meaning of a play. 29 While Miller
emphasizes the nature of the production, Prague School theory focuses
more particularly on the performance, tending to pick up where Miller
leaves off. Prague School theory understands the performance as a network
of meanings; the performance itself is a text. 0
What emerges is a conception of theatre as a complex, multilayered
activity. The production is a function of the perceptions that director and
actors bring to the playwright's text. The production generates the performance, which is also a text. Because the performance is a text, then necessarily
it too is the subject of interpretation. Because the audience is to read the
performance-as-text, it is with the audience that the ultimate responsibility
for meaning lies.
The audience itself, that is, not only is involved in the performance but
also is obliged to be involved-'"we enter the theatre and agree to participate
in the performer-spectator transaction."'" Thus, the pleasure of attending a
play lies not in the passive process of being entertained; rather, it lies in
active participation, an exercise in spectator competence-from the recognition and understanding of the theatrical frame to the much more complex
understanding of the theatrical code.12 The role of the spectator lies literally
in reconstructing the meaning of the play.33

26. Id. at 35.

27. Id.at 67.
28. Id. at 55.

29. ELAm, supra note 12, at 38-44.
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 52.

32. Id. at 94-96; see also id. at 7, 34.
33. One might say that this "spectator's meaning" lies at the end of a chain of conveyed
meanings. The meaning that the actors are attempting to convey by their performance derives
from their understanding of the meaning that the director is trying to convey through her
conceptualization of the play. And the director's meaning derives from her understanding of
the meaning that the author is trying to convey through the text of the script. Nor does this
chain of meaning end with the audience at the particular performance. Subsequent to that
performance, some spectators will function as critics, whose interpretations and assessments
will provide food for thought for other spectators to rethink their own "performance" of the
play, a process that often enough will be carried out in conversation with other spectators of
the same performance. And, of course, this process by which members of the audience make
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Implicit in the question posed to Tom Stoppard is the assumption that
one can ask, "What is the meaning of a play?" A much-honored playwright,

a much-honored director, and a significant intellectual school tell us, however, that the meaning of a play is not a determinate attribute embedded
in the text. Rather, meaning is a particular result of a particular performance. The play, then, is an unfolding event, an event, as has been so well
' 34
put, that "happens halfway between the stage and the audience.
B. Language
This essay began with the proposition that, in order to understand the
meaning of the Constitution, we should treat it as a text to be performed.
We arrived at a description of theatre-the activity of performing performance texts-that locates the meaning of the play not in the text itself but
instead in the performance. No single meaning, however, emerges from
performance. Rather, the meaning is a function of the particular values
that directors and actors bring to the production. We face the spectre of
someone producing Noel Coward's Blithe Spirit as ... a driver's manual.

Does this mean, then, that to treat the Constitution as a text to be
performed is to make it incapable of determinate meaning? Or is the
indeterminacy of the text of a play aberrational as compared to texts
generally? Plays, that is, might well be indeterminate solely because, unlike
texts generally, they are written to be performed. As Jonathan Miller
observes, the "literal act of reading the words of a script does not constitute
a performance."" Indeed, a "play that has been kept unperformed has
36
been aborted.1
Consider, however, Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote,3 7 one of
the Ficciones of the late Argentine writer, Jorge Luis Borges. In this short,
fictional sketch, the narrator, a friend of a recently deceased author, Pierre
Menard, discusses Menard's oeuvre. The narrator gives special attention to
one of Menard's major projects, one that was begun in 1918-the writing
of Don Quixote:
He did not want to compose another Don Quixote-which would
be easy-but the Don Quixote. It is unnecessary to add that his
known and develop their meanings of the play can have a feedback effect on what directors
and actors do in subsequent productions of that play. At subsequent productions of the play,
the audience will often enough be made up both of those who are performing their roles as
a spectator of that play for the first time and of those who are repeating their performance.
Indeed, to conceive of this process'as a chain of meaning is thoroughly inadequate. Rather,
what comes into being is a web of meaning that extends both over time and over those
members of a culture who participate in, or are touched by, theatre.
34. The author remembers this statement from an interview of a playwright on National
Public Radio several years ago. Unfortunately, efforts to track down the particulars have been
unsuccessful.
35. MIILER, supra note 16, at 34.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Jorge Luis Borges, PierreMenard, Author of Don Quixote, in FiccioNa 45 (Anthony
Kerrigan ed. & Anthony Bonner trans., 1962).
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aim was never to produce a mechanical transcription of the original;
he did not propose to copy it. His admirable ambition was to
produce pages which would coincide-word for word and line for
8
line-with those of Miguel de Cervantes.3
Menard, we learn, eschews the altogether too easy approach of trying
to become Cervantes: "To be, in some way, Cervantes and to arrive at
Don Quixote seemed to him less arduous-and consequently less interesting-than to continue being Pierre Menard and to arrive at Don Quixote
'39
through the experiences of Pierre Menard."
Menard, does not, of course, finish the task. A partial text, however,
remains: "the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of Part One ...

and a

fragment of the twenty-second chapter." 4 These fragments indeed "coin41
cide-word for word and line for line-with those of Miguel de Cervantes."1
It is clear that Menard enjoyed a measure of success. Yet, it is also
clear that the two works, nevertheless, are profoundly different:
[The fragmentary Don Quixote of Menard is more subtle than that
of Cervantes. The latter indulges in a rather coarse opposition
between tales of knighthood and the meager, provincial reality of
his country; Menard chooses as "reality" the land of Carmen during
the century of Lepanto and Lope [de Vega] .42
Moreover, it is possible to find in Menard's fragments, as one cannot in
Cervantes's Don Quixote, the influence of Nietzsche. 43 One also observes:
"Equally vivid is the contrast in styles. The archaic style of Menard-in
the last analysis, a foreigner-suffers from a certain affectation. Not so
that of his precursor, who handles easily the ordinary Spanish of his time. '" 44
It is an altogether common habit of mind to approach texts with the
assumption that they are capable of determinate and stable meaning. This
assumption, in turn, rests on a conception of language that it functions as
a window on, or a mirror of, nature-the more perfected the language, the
more accurate its capture of reality. And even if we are aware of indeterminacy and instability in the meaning of texts, and even if we sense that
any language has its particular imperfections, it is also a common habit to
assume that determinacy, stability, and accuracy are the criteria of what
texts and language ought to be and that it is possible to improve our
language so that it satisfies these criteria more closely.
The simple fact, however, is that academicians in the humanities, those
whom we might expect to be the most capable of carrying out the project

38. Id. at 48-49.
39. Id. at 49.
40. Id. at 48.

41. Id.at 49.
42. Id. at 51.
43. Id. at 52.
44. Id. at 53.
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of perfecting our language, have progressively failed to do so. Indeed, the
humanities have become something of a Tower of Babel-far from agreement either on what particular texts mean or even on how one goes about
establishing meaning for texts, there is only an increasingly chaotic diversity
in method and in result.45 Author-oriented interpreters, the hermeneuticians,
contend with the advocates of New Criticism, who seek meaning in the text
itself. Both contend with a bewildering array of rivals-the reader-oriented
interpreters, the deconstructionists who take almost perverse pleasure in
multiplying the number of possible interpretations of a text, the historicist
interpreters and sociocritics who focus on the context in which the text was
written, the formalists who find textual meaning by pigeonholing texts into
one or another archetypical category, and structuralists who seek the underlying universal structure of language.
When an author produces a text, it is relatively safe to assume that she
does so in order to communicate with a reader. What meaning, however,
does- the reader of her text derive? And, more importantly, how does the
reader go about deriving that meaning? Eco's driver's manual and Borges's
Don Quixote illustrate nicely the indeterminacy of the text itself. The
methods of the historicists, sociocritics, and formalists all ultimately founder
on having to make one kind of assumption or another about the author's
intentions-was she a product of her times, or was she trying to break the
conventions of her times? Did she intend to produce this particular category
of text-is her text, seemingly in the form of a poem, really a metaphor
for a driver's manual?
The hermeneutic approach, which commands considerable respect in
our own Constitutional endeavor, also ultimately founders on its own
problem of circularity. We can illustrate the problem by imagining ourselves
coming upon a fragment of text that clearly is part of Don Quixote. But
whose Don Quixote is this? Is it Miguel de Cervantes's? Is it Pierre
Menard's? Let us say that we are told, on excellent authority, that the
fragment is Pierre Menard's. Upon reading the fragment, we can see that
it seems to show the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche. Was it, however,
Menard's intention to incorporate certain of Nietzsche's strict and penetrating insights?
Knowing, of course, that this fragment could not have been written
before 1918, and that Nietzsche last published in 1888,46 we know that this
influence is well within the realm of possibility. But is it a certainty?
Monsieur Menard is deceased, he has thoughtfully destroyed all his notebooks, and his extant letters and recollected conversations do not address
the matter. What is left to us is to demonstrate that the text is entirely
compatible with its having been influenced by the brooding German philosopher, indeed, compellingly so, thereby making our way clear to impute

45. A succinct presentation of the congeries of interpretive schools appears in
E. SCHOLES, SEMIOTICS AND INTERPRETATION 1-16 (1982).
46. See BENET'S READER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 694 (3d ed.

1987).

ROBERT
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such authorial intent to Menard. Unfortunately, of course, we have used
our reading of the text as a means of discovering the author's intent, which
we are seeking to establish in order to arrive at the proper reading of the
text.
Jonathan Miller well understands the unavailability of author's intent:
If we had a video copy of the first performance of Shakespeare's
Twelfth Night, it is no good saying it exemplifies everything that it
shows because people would disagree immediately as to what it is
showing.
...
If called upon to copy it we would copy what we thought was
important, and in'that very act would adapt the production even if
we had agreed to the idea that copying meant producing something
indistinguishable. The reproduction of the play would indeed look
identical to us but a subsequent generation, twenty-five years later,
would wonder why we had picked out various features and not
others from the tape.47
This leaves us with deconstruction. The recent "deconstructive turn" in
humanistic studies has led to an apparent anarchy in textual meaning. At
its extreme, deconstruction involves the playful manipulation of texts in
order deliberately to find often outlandish meanings in them-a metaphor
for creation, for example, in a driver's manual. An approach that posits,
even celebrates, the radical indeterminacy of the text might seem to be the
antithesis to the Rule of Law, allowing the reader almost unlimited power
in determining the meaning of a legal text. Yet, in the theoretical underpinnings of deconstruction lie the elements of an approach to language that
is altogether congenial to the task of providing an account of meaning that
is consistent with the Rule of Law.
The underpinnings of the deconstructionists' mad rush toward chaos in
meaning lie in the early twentieth century thought of a structuralist, the
Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure. In his description of language, de
Saussure emphasized the distinction between the structure of language, la
langue, from language in use, parole.4 Focusing his attention on la langue,
de Saussure posited that the basic element of language structure is the
linguistic sign, made up of the signifier-the word or sound pattern-and
the signified-the concept that the signifier embodies. 49 It was de Saussure's
insight that the linguistic sign is arbitrary. 0 That is, the form of the signifier

47. MILLER, supra note 16, at 52-53.
48. See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 7-15 (Charles Bally
& Albert Sechehaye eds. & Wade Baskin trans., McGraw-Hill 1966) (1959); see also JONATHAN'
CULLER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE 39-45 (rev. ed. 1986); RoY HARRIS, READING SAUSSURE 2125 (1987); TERENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM & SEMIOTICS 20-22 (1977).
49. See DE SAUSSURE, supra note 48, at 65-67; HAWKES, supra note 48, at 24-25.
50. See DE SAUSSURE, supra note 48, at 67-69; CUTLER, supra note 48, at 28-33; HAWKES,
supra note 48, at 25-26.
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is not a consequence of the signified-the signifier is not generated by any
of the attributes of the concept embodied in the signified.
For example, the signifier for the signified that denotes a four-legged
mammal with hyperactive panting at one end and hyperactive tail-wagging
at the other end can, and does, take a variety of forms-"dog" in English,
"chien" in French, "hund" in German. 5 None of these signifiers is, of
itself, "doggish" in any way. The form of the signifier does not depend
on the particular attributes either of the signified or of the phenomenon
2
which the signified captures.1
Moreover, although the sign refers to particular perceived phenomena
in the world "out there," the substantive content-the meaning-of any
one sign is a function not of these phenomena but instead of the structure
of the system of signs that makes up the language. As de Saussure put it,
"inlanguage there are only differences without positive terms.' '53 The
meaning of a sign, that is, is not a positive aspect of that sign; rather, this
meaning is negative in the sense that it is not the meaning of all of the
54
other signs in the structure.
The implications of de Saussure's structuralist account of language are
rather unsettling. The story in Genesis of Adam naming the animals 55
captures our subconscious assumption that we can know reality only through
language. "Naming makes it so" goes the common aphorism,5 6 although
we presume that reality determines the names that we bestow. What emerges
from de Saussure's account of the arbitrary linguistic sign, however, is the
surprising tenuousness of the relationship between language and reality.
Perhaps the deepest and most insightful working out of the consequences
of the structuralist account of language is the work of the French theorist
Jacques Derrida. 57 In Derrida's analysis, language is an abstraction from
reality rather than a capture of it.58 Language is an abstraction in the sense
that meaning is a consequence not of an ultimate exterior truth but instead
of the abstraction-the imposition of structure-that language makes possible.5 9

51. See DE SAuSSURE, supra note 48, at 67-68; CULLER, supra note 48, at 28-29.
52. The exception to this rule is onomatopoeia, defined as the "formation of words in
imitation of natural sounds ...(as buzz, hiss, bob-white)." WEBSTER'S THIaR NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTONARY 1577 (1981). For a discussion, see DE SAUsstnR, supra note 48, at 69.
53. DE SAussuE, supra note 48, at 120.
54. See HAwKEs, supra note 48, at 28.
55. Genesis 3:19-20.
56. See E TqsCASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND M=m 23-43 (Susanne K. Langer trans., Dover
1953) (1946).
57. See Jom K. SHERxnU, THE FATE OF MEANING: CHARLES PEIRCE, STRUCTURALISM,
AND LITERATrE 35 (1989). Derrida's most prominent development of these consequences is
JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976). A succinct presentation
of Derrida's concept of language as sign system, a presentation that is admirably approachable,
given the complexity, counter-intuitiveness, and paradoxical nature of Derrida's concepts, is
set out in SHERFF, supra, at 32-50.

58. See SHERIss, supra note 57, at 38.
59. See id. at 34.
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Moreover, because no positive meaning exists in the individual signs
that make up language, language is a system in which there is only the
endless deferral of meaning. 60 Because of this deferral, then, the meaning
of a text depends on context.6 ' Because, however, the possible contexts are
without limit, and because no one context captures all possible contexts,
the speaker's intention cannot limit meaning and there is no possibility of
the meaning of a text.62 Hence the phenomenon of deconstruction-with
meaning endlessly deferred, there can be no closure of any text. The meaning
of any text turns out to be whatever meaning one has arrived at when one
stops for whatever reason-perhaps only exhaustion-deconstructing it.
So far, we seem only to be going further astray. While the formalists,
historicists, sociocritics, and hermeneuticians cannot provide a complete
account of meaning and cannot point the way toward deriving fully determinate meaning from a text, they surely approach closure rather than utter
chaos. Moreover, despite what the deconstructionists can do with texts, we
know quite well that, in fact, we do convey meaning with language. It is
6
true that the communication process does not always proceed perfectly.
To say, however, that the process works imperfectly is decidedly not to say
that it does not work at all.
Shift the focus of inquiry, however, from structure-la langue-to
process-parole. The American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce proposed
a concept of the linguistic sign that differed strikingly from that of his
structuralist contemporary, de Saussure.6 For Peirce, the linguistic sign
is'
something which stands to somebody for something in some
respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is creates in the
mind of that person an equivalent sign ... which ... I call the

interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference
to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground ....
Peirce elaborated on his concept of the ground in this way: "If a Sign is
other than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or expression,
some explanation or argument or other context, showing how-upon what

60. Id.at 45.
61. Id.at 44-45.
62. Id.

63. For engaging accounts of the nature and cause of conversational miscommunication,
accounts which also are suggestive of the account of the processes of meaning that this essay
is intended to explore, see DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT: How CONVE .SATIONAL STYLE MAKES OR BREAKS YOUR RELATIONS wrrH OTms (1986); DEBORAH TANNEN,
YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990).
64. SHEREFF, supra note 57, at 53-72, presents an accessible account of Peirce's different,
but equally difficult, concept of language as sign system.
65. Charles Sanders Peirce, Division of Signs, in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE 228, at 135 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1931-35) [hereinafter
COLLECTED PAPERS]. The quote in the text appears in SiIE.IFi, supra note 57, at 56.
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system or for what reason-the Sign represents the Object ... that it
does.""
Peirce's definition of the linguistic sign at first blush appears to be
hopelessly vague-"something which stands to somebody for something in
some respect." 67 On closer consideration, however, one can see that it offers
a far more complex account of language. First, the sign is as much a
process as it is a thing. What is important ,to Peirce is that the sign creates
a second sign, the interpretant, and meaning is a function of this interpretant.
Second, Peirce accounts for meaning not in terms of an arbitrary sign,
lodged in a structure of signs and taking its meaning from that structure
negatively. Rather, meaning derives positively through the function of the
ground, a function of an "idea," "explanation," or "argument." In
Peirce's scheme, then, the ground seems to function as a set of values
which determines the relationships among the object, "the sign, and the
interpretant.
Third, Peirce's conceptualization takes the reified object of the structuralist account from somewhere "out there" into the mind. The sign has
meaning only in relation to the interpretant, which is a concept in the mind
of the addressee of the sign. Moreover, the ground-"a sort of idea"-is
a mental concept as well. Language, then, is a process, inseparable from
what we do. And what we do is an activity in the human mind.
Peirce left his concept of the linguistic sign undeveloped in substantial
respects, particularly with respect to the ground. We can, however, derive
an understanding of what the nature of the ground must be from the
present-day work of Stanley Fish. Just as Jonathan Miller and Tom Stoppard
do not regard meaning to be an attribute of the text of a play, Fish counts
himself as among those "who preach the instability of the text and the
unavailability of determinate meanings." 68 According to Fish, we do not
find meaning in texts:
meanings come already calculated, not because of norms embedded
in the language but because language is always perceived, from the
very first, within a structure of norms. That structure, however, is
not abstract and independent but social; and therefore it is not a
single structure ... that changes when one situation, with its
assumed background of practices, purposes, and goals, has given

66. Division of Signs, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 65,
in the text appears in Saniuii, supra note 57, at 56.

230, at 136. The quote

67. Compare a Prague School description of theatre: "Everything that makes up reality
on the stage-the playwright's text, the actor's acting, the stage lighting-all these things in
every case stand for other things. In other words, dramatic performance is a set of signs."
Jindrich Honzl, Dynamics of the Sign in the Theater, 6 SLovo A SLOVESNOST 177 (1940),
reprinted in SEwonTcs oF ART, supra note 12, at 74. This definition makes it possible to speak

of performance in the theatre as a text.
68. SAN.=Y FisH, Is THERE A TEXT iN Tins CLAss? THE AuTHORiTY OF INTERPRETI v
ComamNrrms 305 (1980) [hereinafter FISH, Is THRE A TExT?].

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:293

way to another. In other words, the shared basis of agreement...
is never not already found, although it is not always the same one."'
These structures of norms form the basis for what Fish terms interpretive
communities-"meanings are the property neither of fixed and stable texts
nor of free and independent readers but of interpretive communities that
are responsible both for the shape of a reader's activities and for the texts
those activities produce." ' 70 Thus, while the text itself is unstable and a
determinate meaning of it is unavailable, any of us at any particular time
will experience that text as stable and determinate to the extent that we are
members of an interpretive community. We belong to such a community
simply by the fact that we successfully communicate with others through
language. Those with whom we can communicate successfully make up our
interpretive community.
Fish's point is that we experience language within a structure of sociallycreated norms. The interpretive community is nothing more or less than the
social group which generates these norms and whose members hold them.
Meaning cannot be a matter of individual free play because of the norms
structure that an individual's particular interpretive community holds. While
this structure is subject to change over time, 7' the very fact that the
community members do communicate among themselves suggests that this
norms structure is relatively stable in the short run.
Moreover, no meta-structure of norms is available; rather, only alternative, particular norms structures are available. Thus, two individuals, each
a member of a different interpretive community, will read the same text
differently. Consistent with the notion that no meta-structure of norms is
available, there is no neutral position from which to read a text. To interpret
a text-that is, to bring meaning to it-requires a norms structure. We
must view the world from within one set of norms or another.
Stanley Fish's concept of the interpretive community provides a way of
understanding the ground of Peirce's linguistic sign. Functionally, the ground
provides a set of assumptions within which we immediately experience any
text. 72 There is no "distance between one's receiving of an utterance and
the determination of its meaning-[no] ... dead space when one has only
the words and then faces the task of construing them. '73 Moreover, the
assumptions which the ground brings to the linguistic sign form a particular
set of socially created norms, implicit assumptions about the nature of the

69. Id. at 318.
70. Id. at 322. Thomas Kuhn describes scientific activity in the same way when he speaks
of the "paradigms" that "scientific communities" hold. THOMAS S. KuHN, TH-E STRUCTURE
OF ScEarn~mc REvOLUTIONS 174-98 (2d ed. 1970).
71. Fish explores the nature, processes, and consequences of change in the beliefs that
an interpretive community holds in STANLEY FISH, DoING WHAT Cosas NATURALLY: CHANGE,
RHroRIc, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUmms 141-60 (1989)
[hereinafter FIsH, DoING WHAT ComsS NATURALLY].
72. FisH, Is THERE A TEXT?, supra note 68, at 318.
73. Id.
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world, assumptions which generate the meaning of the otherwise empty
structure of signs. Jonathan Miller clearly understands how the ground
determines the meaning that we bring to a text when he observes, "Perception always approaches its domain with interests, preoccupations and prejudices about what is important in a work whether of art or literature." 74
Over time, the particular set of norms that the ground embodies is
subject to change. The change that any particular interpretive community
experiences, however, is not part of a larger process that leads to a
convergence of norms among different interpretive communities. The change
leads instead simply to another set of norms, a different ideology, for that
community. The sets of norms remain heterogeneous among interpretive
communities.
We can glimpse the nature of the ground of language in our reactions
to periods of radical cultural change. The Civil War precipitated just such
a period. The theretofore novel American experience of the North in carrying
out a massive undertaking through mass organization made possible the
rapid reorganization of productive enterprise into the hierarchical capitalist
structure that fully emerged by the end of the nineteenth century. 75 Writing
in 1869, however, Charles Francis Adams, Jr. described "the system of
corporate
life" as "a new power, for which our language contains no
76
name."

Some one hundred and twenty five years later, we again have entered
a period of rapid cultural change, a period in which a long-standing
consensus over the permissible content and style of public discourse has
crumbled under the onslaught of urgently pressed claims for the recognition
of alternative values-gender and racial equality, sexual orientation, and

dissenting political views. A recent intensive sociological study revealed a
growing perception of, and unease over, impersonality and fragmentation
in American life, an unease which is leading toward a growing yearning for
the possibility of a more communitarian way of life." This study further
revealed a striking inability of people to articulate this yearning. 7 The desire
for, and the values of, this alternative way of life turn out to be as ineffable
as the system of corporate life was for Charles Francis Adams.
What these two examples suggest is that this ineffability-the inability
to capture in language emerging ways of life-is a direct consequence of
the ground of language. The particular norms that make up the ground

74. See supra text accompanying note 23.
75. GEORGE M. FREDRICKsoN, THE INNER Civi WAR:

NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND
TBE CRISIS OF rT UNION 98-112, 199-225 (Harper Torchbook ed. 1968) (1965).

76. Charles F. Adams, Jr., A Chapter of Erie, 109 N. Am. REv. 1, 105 (1869), reprinted
in

CHAPTERS oF ERIE AND OTHER ESsAYS 1, 97 (Charles F. Adams, Jr. & Henry Adams eds.,
1871). The quote in the text appears in AIAN TRAcHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA:
CULTURE & SocIETY n THE GILDED AGE 3 (1982).
77. ROBERT N. BEu.AH ET AL., HArrs OF TiE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT
IN AMERIcAN LIF (1985).

78. Id. at viii, 19-20, 151, 157.
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necessarily reflect so strongly the now receding way of life that the norms
consistent with the emerging way of life are absent from the ground. Because
they are absent, then necessarily our language does not allow us the
capability for expressing the emerging way of life.
These examples also demonstrate the complexity of the process by which
the particular substantive content of the ground comes about. Change in
the ground appears to come about as a process of slippage between what I
have just termed "an emerging way of life" and the particular substantive
content of the ground, which reflects the recently dominant but now eroding
way of life. If we understand the world through language, then the very
fact of slippage indicates that there are both positive and normative elements
to our experience of the world. Indeed, the slippage is between these two
facets.
The positive element is the ground, which brings to bear a set of
norms-an ideology-within the operation of the Peircean process of language, thereby shaping how we view the world at a subconscious level;
there is no "distance between one's receiving of an utterance and the
determination of its meaning. '79 The normative element-how we ought to
view the world-necessarily operates at a more conscious level. This element
is captured by the term "world view," or cosmology.8 0 Because we understand the world through language and because we do have a conscious
world view, the particular substantive content of the ground must come
about as a complex process of mutual feedback between the ground of
language and the world view. Our examples show that we glimpse this
process when there is substantial slippage between the two.
Language, as the ongoing project of the structuralists demonstrates, is
reifiable into an object. If we are to explain, however, how language workshow texts in particular and the world in general come to have meaningthen we must understand language as a process. Moreover, it is a social
process, one in which each of us participates intimately; language is a
human social practice. We saw that the play is not so much an object as
it is an event that arises out of the mutual experience of actors and audience.
We see that language, too, is an event-as William Butler Yeats asked,
"How can we know the dancer from the dance?" 81
We now have an explanation for the intuitively unsettling arbitrariness
of the linguistic sign. Language is not a tool for capturing the meaning
inherent in things. It is not a transparent window on the world. Rather,

79. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
80. By "world view" or "cosmology" is meant a "way of life," a viable combination
of shared values and beliefs and of patterns of interpersonal relations. MICHAEL THo1psoN ET
AL., CuL.aruRA THEORY 1 (1990). So defined, there are a limited number of particular and
alternative ways of life available, each of which incorporates a particular and incomplete
understanding of the world. Id. at 3. For a succinct introduction, see Mary Douglas, Introduction to ESSAYS IN TE SOCIOLOoY OF PERCEPTION 1-8 (Mary Douglas ed., 1982).
81. WILLIAm BUTLER YEATS, Among School Children, in THE PoEms OF W. B. YEATS
215, 217 (Richard J. Finnerman ed., 1983).
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language functions as an often highly selective filtering process of what it
is that lies outside of ourselves. The norms embedded in the ground
determine the filtering process. These norms can change, and as they change,
meaning changes as well.
II.

JUDGG

I began this essay with the purpose of demonstrating how we can treat
the Constitution as a performance document consistently with the Rule of
Law. Yet, in exploring the nature of meaning, I have strayed even further
from the idea that texts can have determinate meaning. Instead, the view
that has emerged in the foregoing analysis is that meaning is a function of
what we do with texts. Theatre is an activity by which we bring meaning
to the text of a play. Language is an activity by which we bring meaning
to an ultimately incomplete and always-evolving sign system that makes up
language.
82
On the idea that I may as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb, I
propose now to offer a description of the law in just the same way as we
have looked at theatre and language-not as a reified object but instead as
an activity that we experience. The legal realist movement provides a
suggestive starting point for this kind of description. Writing in 1931,
Jerome Frank, one of the more articulate and prolific of the legal realists,
picked up on the notion of the "judicial hunch." 3 As Judge Frank described
it, the judge determines the outcome of the case before her in an intuitive
and impressionistic way. Having formed a conclusion, the judge then works
backwards from the decision to its rationale, to state the outcome in terms
of the law as set out in.the texts of precedent and statute. 4 Contrast this
legal realist view with that of the formalists, who conceive the judicial
outcome as a function of antecedent legal principles applied to the circumstances of the dispute. To the formalists, the judicial process proceeds
deductively-from given Rule to Case to Result."5
These two views-realist and formalist-describe the judicial process.
What, however, is the law itself? The formalists would define the law as a
coherent rational structure of principles and rules. The matter becomes
interesting when one asks how one learns of this structure. The straightforward answer would offer the ongoing occupation of legal academiciansto determine this structure from the accumulated body of judicial decisions.
The first matter of interest is that this academic practice involves the
entirely different logical category of induction-proceeding from Result to
Case to arrive at the Rule. This progression, however, suggests that the

82. 1 have shamelessly stolen the use of this hoary expression from EZRA J. MisHAN,
WELFARE EcONOlES: AN AsSSMEarT 49 (1969).

83. Frank, supra note 9, at 655 (citing Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive:
The Function of the "Hunch" in JudicialDecisions, 14 CoiRNEL L.Q. 274 (1929)).
84. Id. at 655-63, 764-69; Hutcheson, supra note 83, at 285.

85. Frank, supra note 9, at 648-49.
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Result generates the Rule, which is contradictory to the formalist view of
judicial deduction, and which returns us to the problem of integrity. Of
further interest is the ambiguity of this inductive practice. Experience with
this practice confirms that it is simply not possible to fit all decisions into
the structure of principles and rules without compromising its coherence.
The academician, therefore, must select among the cases. Since the field
that is selected determines the structure that is reported, then the fact that
selection occurs suggests that the academician has crossed the line from the
activity of reportage to the activity of creation. The deduction-induction
account of the law is clearly unsatisfactory on its own terms.
We have not, however, exhausted our logical inquiry. There is a third
category of reasoning, abduction, by which the Result directly generates the
Rule, which is then applied to the Case.86 The endeavor of scientific inquiry
provides a ready example-the working out of 8the
orbit of Mars by the
7
seventeenth-century astronomer Johannes Kepler.
Kepler's first step was to observe certain facts about the position of
Mars over time, for instance, positions a and b.1s His next step was
abduction. Using these facts, Kepler hypothesized an elliptical orbit for
Mars because, were it true, the observed positions of Mars would be a
matter of course. Kepler's following step was deduction. Based on the
hypothesis of an elliptical orbit, he predicted other positions of Mars, for
instance, c and d. Finally, Kepler tested the hypothesis by checking whether
these deduced predictions were correct. This final step is induction. Abduction, then, yields a hypothesis; deduction derives various consequences from
the abduced hypothesis; and induction tests these deduced consequences.
This description captures the standard paradigm of scientific investigation at its least complex. More commonly, however, the process does not
begin and end with a single abduced hypothesis. For example, it often
happens that the testing process of induction shows that the deduced
consequences-for instance, predictions e and f of the orbital position of

86. A brief presentation of the three forms of logical reasoning appears in UMBERTO
Eco, SEMIoncs AND THE PmLosoPHY oF LANGUAGE 39-43 (1986). Charles Sanders Peirce treated
the category of abduction more extensively. See CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, Abduction and

Induction, in PHInOSOPHICA

WRITINGs OF PEIRCE 150-56 (Justus Buchler ed., 1955). The

discussion in Abduction and Induction is a compilation of several fragments that Peirce wrote
at different periods. Lessons from the History of Science, in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note
65,
71-74, at 29-31; Pragmatism and Abduction, in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra, 189, at
117; Hume on Miracles, in 6 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra,
522-528, at 356-360; A Neglected
Argument for the Reality of God, in 6 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra, 477, at 325. For further
useful discussion, see James F. Harris & Kevin D. Hoover, Abduction and the New Riddle of
Induction, 63 THE MONIST 329 (1980).
87. Kepler's work on the orbit of Mars is one of the examples that Peirce used to
illustrate abduction. Lessons from the History of Science, in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note
65,
71-74, at 29-31; Partial Synopsis of a Proposed Work in Logic, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS,
supra,
96-97, at 53-56.
88. Kepler's three steps are described in Partial Synopsis of a Proposed Work in Logic,
in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 65, 97, at 54-56.
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Mars-are not confirmed by actual observation; there is a deviation between
predicted and observed positions. A further step of abduction is then
necessary, adjusting the hypothesis to account for the new evidence. 9 This
variant can involve an iterative feedback process which repeatedly adjusts
the hypothesis until it exactly fits perceived reality.
The discovery of the planet Neptune provides an example of this more
complex interactive abductive process. The succession of divergences between
predicted and actual orbital positions of Uranus ultimately generated an
abduced orbit whose shape could only be explained by the influence of a
yet undiscovered planet. Abduction yielded a hypothesized orbit for this
new planet, deduction yielded predicted orbital positions, and observation
confirmed its existence. 90
The logical category of abduction provides a powerful concept for
describing what the legal realists observed of the judicial process of decisionmaking. The judicial practice of working back from the decision to the
rationale fits the abductive step of adjusting Rule to Result. Under this
description, judicial decisionmaking proceeds in a way that is strongly
analogous to scientific practice, as an iterative process of adjusting the rules
and principles embodied in precedent to the outcomes of disputes. Legal
academicians seem to capture the apparent structure of rules and principles
that comprise "the law" by induction from judicial outcomes. It is entirely
consistent with the legal realists' description of the judicial process as
abductive that the academicians find that the law is always in the process
of becoming. 9' The legal realists' description is consistent as well with the
views of Jonathan Miller and the Prague School that the meaning of
precedent-the law embodied in prior text-also is always in the process of
becoming.
If, however, it is dispute outcomes that infuse principles and precedent
with meaning through an abductive process, what generates these outcomes?
More particularly, why is it that the outcome of any dispute is nothing
more than the product of judicial caprice, a function, as critics of the legal
realist position put it, of what the judge had for breakfast?9 2 We can see
more clearly the complex nature of the process that generates meaning in
the law by considering several examples of judicial decisionmaking.

89. For a description of this iterative process, see JOHN N. DEELY, LoGIc AS LmERAL
ART: RETIUNKING LOoIC IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SEMIOTIcs (Toronto Semiotic Circle Monograph
No. 3, 1985); John N. Deely, The Coalescence of Semiotic Consciousness, in FRONTIERS IN
SEMonTcs 5, 28-29 (John N. Deely et al. eds., 1986).
90. 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Macropaedia 171 (15th ed. 1990).
91. Morton Horwitz, describing a nineteenth century treatise writer whose work quickly
became outdated as courts fashioned new doctrines, notes that the "common law is especially
cruel to those whom it casts aside. It either ignores them, soon forgetting that they ever
existed, or, more usually, uses them as authority for propositions they did not accept."
MORTON J. HoRwTrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 38 (1977).
92. E.g., Robert M. Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, 7 AM. L.
SCe. REv. 1051, 1054 (1934).
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In a compelling analysis of the medieval English judicial record, Roger
Groot has traced the course of decisions in the early thirteenth century by
which suicide became a felony. 93 Today, of course, this development seems
quite puzzling. Why impose legal sanctions on an act that, by its very
nature, renders the perpetrator unavailable for punishment?
The puzzle clears up, however, if we consider the consequences at that
time of making this act a felony, the larger development of the legal
treatment of instances of sudden death, and the nature of the medieval
cosmology. One consequence of an act being a felony was the forfeiture of
the chattels of the perpetrator. This had the effect of thrusting on the
suicide's community a burden of care for the suicide's surviving dependents.
Also relevant is the judicial treatment of the larger matter of sudden
death. If the death had come about by homicide, a murder fine fell on the
community. In the case of an accident, moreover, the practice was to
destroy the instrument of the accident; if a tree branch had accidentally
fallen and killed a passerby, the tree was destroyed. The community was
thereby impoverished to the extent that the tree had value to it. Once
suicide had become a felony, there was a consistent effect in these three
cases of sudden death-a burden of some substantial sort fell on the
community in which the death had occurred. The community itself, that is,
suffered a form of punishment.
That the justices would derive this consistent treatment, and that they
would treat these events in the particular way that they did, seems to be
altogether consistent with the medieval mind. It is difficult to imagine today
what the medieval consciousness was like. Our consciousness is thoroughly
Cartesian, experiencing the world in terms of a sharp subject-object dichotomy.14 Each of us is "in here," with a sharp boundary between the
self and the rest of the "out there" world. Moreover, we limit the "out
there" world only to that which we can apprehend and measure with the
senses.
The medieval consciousness, by contrast, experienced an enchanted,
moral world, an experience that was participatory and reciprocal rather than
detached and manipulative. 95 The world was moral in the sense that everything happened for a reason, whether that reason was bound up in good
or in evil. The world was enchanted in that the greater part of creation,,
and the more powerful part, was incorporeal. Moreover, corporeal beings,
including what we would call inanimate objects, were capable of being
imbued with these incorporeal spirits, which were usually invisible but on

93. Roger D. Groot, When Suicide Became Felony (Oct. 29, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
94. For an extended argument that human consciousness in the Western world has
radically changed from the "participating consciousness" of medieval times to the "Cartesian
consciousness" of the present, see MORRIS BERMAN, THE REENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD
(1981). For a description of Cartesian consciousness, see id. at 15-65.
95. For descriptions of the medieval participating consciousness, see id at 67-132;
CAROLLY ERICKSON, THE MEDIEVAL VISION: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND PERCEPTION 3-47 (1976).
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occasion visible. The experience was participatory in that the medieval
individual found herself immersed in a highly charged, highly value-laden
milieu-a creation that was alive 96-rather than demarcated, as we experience
ourselves, from an amoral, mechanistic world.
A star, for example, to our mind is simply a lifeless object that exists
a huge distance away. To the medieval mind, however, a star was an entity
animated by, and forming a link with, incorporeal beings. As such, it could
reflect, and thus reveal, the purposes and designs of the incorporeal realm
and could also directly influence the individual. We experience faint echoes
of the enchanted, moral, participatory world of the medieval consciousness
when we celebrate Halloween with all its goblins, witches, and ghosts.
The medieval mind, then, would not easily be able to conceive of what
today we would call an "accident," something that happens without the
fault of a responsibility-bearing person. A sudden death by accident was an
event with no overt explanation. It was, however, an event that must have
had a cause, and the cause must have been rooted in morality. Because a
sudden death was a breach of the normal order of things, it must have
been an event that arose out of some occurrence of evil within the community in which it happened. Thus, also, the community must bear responsibility and suffer punishment for an evil hidden in its midst.
Suicide, because it too was a breach of the normal order of things,
must be the result of some hidden evil within the community, and the law
must see to it that the community bear responsibility in some tangible way
for harboring evil. Thus, the medieval English justices, by coming to treat
suicide as a felony, quite simply were acting consistently with their cosmology. Because that cosmology was necessarily embedded in the ground
of their language, it was altogether congenial with that cosmology to speak
of suicide as a category of act for which the law imposed responsibility in
a proper way.
The seventeenth century was a period of transition from the medieval
participatory cosmology to our modern Cartesian cosmology. Paradine v.
Jane,97 a chestnut of the law school property course which arose out of the
unrest during the English Civil War, affords a glimpse of the process of
this transition. The dispute in Paradinewas over whether a tenant holding
land for a term for years continued to owe rent during a period when he
had been deprived of possession, through no fault of either landlord or
tenant, by the King's forces.
The outcome turned on how the court was to conceptualize the relationship between landlord and tenant-was it more like the hierarchical
tenure between the medieval lord and vassal, by which the two parties were
bound up in a highly.personal, reciprocal relationship, 9 or was it impersonal,

96. ERuCKsoN, supra note 95, at 12-13.
97. Aleyn 27, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
98. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 27, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647). The court noted
that, "where the law creates a duty or charge ....
there the law will excuse him." Id.
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arising out of an arms length bargain between equal and autonomous
individuals that typifies the market transaction today? 99 The language of
the lease agreement was ambiguous, falling neatly between the rubrics that
captured each of the two kinds of relationship. 10 The court, obviously
aware that it was engaged in a doctrinal departure, reached its outcome by
conceptualizing the relationship as an arms length bargain. The court thereby
chose to place the landlord-tenant relationship within the emerging modern
cosmology of individual autonomy.
The landmark decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in 1970 in Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 1 1
affords a third glimpse of the deep issues at stake in the judicial process.
In Javins, the court was struggling to alleviate the circumstances of the
impoverished tenants of slum-condition urban apartments by imposing on
the landlord responsibility for the physical condition of the apartments
during the lease term. 02 In his opinion, Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright
expressly rejected applying "landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal prop3
erty law" 00-"leases
of urban dwelling units should be interpreted and
construed like any other contract."'14 The opinion then proceeds to infer a
warranty of habitability into the lease of an urban apartment. 05
As an exegesis on contract doctrine-either by way of applying it or
by way of developing or changing it-the opinion fails.'06 There is no
analysis of the expectations that ought to arise from the quality of the
consideration that flows to the landlord. 0 7 Nor is there any treatment of
the matter of warranty disclaimer. 08 The court, having conceptualized the
99. See id. at 898. The court added, "for the law would not protect him beyond his
own agreement." Id.
100. See id. at 897. The courted stated: "Now the rent is a duty created by the parties
upon the reservation." Id. That is, the way in which the parties expressed their relationship
was not like one of feudal tenure, in which the tenant's duty to render rent-service, and the
reciprocal duty of the landlord to defend the tenant's possession, would arise out of the mere
fact of that tenurial relationship. Nor, apparently, did the lease agreement contain an express
promise by the tenant to pay a certain rent, particularly one that was unconditioned on ouster
of possession by a stranger to the relationship. Rather, the lease agreement contained a
reservation of rent by the landlord, a provision of the form, "L grants possession to T for a
term of X at a rent of Y." The particular form in which the rent payment was expressed
being neither fish (tenurial in nature) nor fowl (contractual in nature), the court cast the issue
as having to classify it as one or the other.
101. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
102. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
103. Id. at 1074.
104. Id. at 1075.
105. Id. at 1077.
106. In terms of impact, of course, the opinion was a considerable success. E.g., Eyal
Zamir, Toward a General Concept of Conformity in the Performance of Contracts, 52 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1991). Zamir observed: "The new ruling [Javins] was shortly adopted in most of
the states of the United States, and, following the case law, legislative reforms were carried
out in many states, thereby crystallizing the new rule." Id. at 26.
107. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079.
108. See id. at 1080.
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case as a contract dispute, offered a rationalization for the outcome that it
wanted to reach that was, in terms of contract doctrine, clearly forced.
The problem, of course, is that the court wanted to make the landlord
responsible for the welfare of the tenant. Such responsibility, however, is
not compatible with the assumptions of atomistic individualism and market
impersonality that underlie the modem conceptualization of bargain. Ironically, the responsibility of the lord for the feudal tenant that lies at the
core of the "feudal property law" that the court so summarily rejected is
entirely compatible with the outcome that the court wanted to reach.
These three examples reveal much about the complex nature of the
judicial process. They demonstrate quite clearly the logical pattern of
abduction. In each example, the court reached an outcome that was a clear
departure from precedent. In each, the outcome of the dispute required a
substantial development of, or addition to, the structure of principles and
rules that one might derive from precedent. The Result generated the Rule
to be embodied in the law as text.
Moreover, these three examples offer a glimpse of courts interacting
with the ground of their language as they resolved the disputes before them.
The medieval English court redefined an event, suicide, to conform to the
then dominant, homogeneous ground that derived from the participatory
medieval consciousness. The seventeenth century English court, at a time
of transition toward the modern Cartesian cosmology, reached its outcome
by reconceptualizing the relationship between the parties in more modern
terms, consciously reformulating the law to bring it forward into the
emerging cosmology. The contemporary United States Court of Appeals,
strongly desiring to bind a corporate urban landlord into a supportive
relationship with its impoverished tenants, was, like Charles Francis Adams,
Jr. a century earlier, unable to "find a name" for this relationship in a
language whose ground is imbued with the modern cosmology of the
impersonal marketplace. The court could provide only a forced rationalization for the outcome that it had chosen.
As these examples show, a court is sometimes complicit with the ideology
that the ground of its language embodies. Sometimes, a court is resistent
to this ideology. Sometimes, a court consciously tries to shift it. The ground,
however, necessarily plays a strong role in the meaning that the legal process
generates.
Because of this strong role, the meaning of the text of the law, like the
meaning of the play, will not converge into stability and determinacy.
Meaning will not converge because the circumstances in which disputes arise
change as human technology and the sheer presence of humanity generate
continued change in our physical situation.10' More importantly, meaning

109. The illustrative example of the abductive process, determining the orbit of the planet

Mars is dissimilar from the three judicial examples in a particular way-Kepler's investigations
converged on a determinate, stable orbit for Mars; the examples from the law suggest that

there will be no convergence in legal meaning. The dissimilarity, however, is only apparent.
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will not converge because language-the communicative code of the law as
text-changes as our cosmology changes and interacts with language's
ground.
It is inevitable that our cosmology changes. Thomas Kuhn's concept of
scientific paradigms describes the process." 0 There is a recurring pattern in
the practice of science. At any particular time, a particular paradigm-"the
entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the
members of a given community"I'-will govern that practice. A new
paradigm, however, will begin to capture the imagination of that scientific
community because it offers solutions to certain currently vexing problems
that remain unsolved under current practice. Kuhn's scientific revolution is
the displacement of an old paradigm by a new one.
Once this revolution has occurred, scientific investigators will then
develop this new paradigm by using it to solve an ever-widening range of
problems." 2 Ultimately, however, there arises a growing set of nagging
problems that are incapable of solution within the now dominant new
paradigm. At this point, adherence to this paradigm begins to break down
when someone proposes yet another paradigm that solves this current set
of insoluble problems."' The stage is now set for a new revolution.
Thomas Kuhn's descriptions do not apply just to scientific practice.
Just as his concept of scientific communities offers the same account of
4
meaning as does Stanley Fish's concept of interpretive communities,"
Kuhn's description of scientific practice applies to human experience gen-6
erally."' Kuhn equates scientific revolutions to changes in world view."
When a new paradigm has emerged, scientific practitioners now see the
same phenomena differently; they no longer observe as before. 17 Paradigms,
then, and the ideologies that they generate in the ground of language, are
necessarily incomplete. Because they are incomplete, language acts as a filter
of the phenomena of the physical world.
Any paradigm, any cosmology, any ideology, is powerful because of
the insights that it provides. At the same time, however, that it allows us

The physical circumstances of the solar system do change; this change, however, is infinitesimal
over the time frame of Kepler's observations, unlike change in the context of the time frame
in which judges resolve disputes. Kepler's investigations would not have converged on a stable

"meaning" of the orbit of Mars were conditions in the solar system to change at the same
rate as change in the human physical and social context in which courts work.
110. KUHN, supra note 70.
111. Id. at 175.
112. Id. at 10-51. This activity proceeds by way of what Kuhn terms "convergent
thinking." THomAs S. KuHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIEs m SCIENTnMC TRADITION AND CHANGE 225-39 (1977) [hereinafter KuHN, ESSENTIAL TENSION].
113. KUHN, supra note 70, at 52-135. This activity proceeds by way of "divergent

thinking." KUHN,
114.
115.
116.
117.

ESSENTIAL TENSION,

supra note 112, at 225-39.

See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
See THOMSON, supra note 80, at 69-100.
KUHN, supra note 70, at 111-35.
Id. at 132-35.
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to see, its inevitable incompleteness blinds us to other ways of seeing." 8
Thus, our language-created world of experience is incomplete, and we will
eventually become dissatisfied with the incompleteness of that particular
world. This is why, over time, human experience is an experience of changing
cosmology. Indeed, we can understand Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law"9 as nothing other than a trenchant description
of a paradigm shift in legal meaning carried out through an abductive
process of judicial dispute resolution. Horwitz's description thus exemplifies
the shifting nature of legal meaning that does not converge into stability
and determinacy.
These accounts of meaning also explain why the realist account of the
judicial process is not a prescription for judicial caprice. When judges depart
from the law as text, they clearly are appealing to different values from
those embedded in prior law. Their appeal, however, is made with language
and to use language is to use ideology-the ideology embedded in the
ground. That is, the very act of communication is a sharing with the
addressee of the values embedded in language. In this sense, then, the
different values to which the judge appeals in departing from the law as
text are not capriciously applied personal values; rather, they are socially
constructed values.'
The pragmatic truth of the legal realist account is that the law can only
be what "judges do about the disputes before them." The critics of the
realist account are mistaken in charging that this conceives the law as a
function of what the judge has for breakfast. It is true that there is no
stability in, or convergence of, legal meaning. This instability is not,
however, a consequence of judicial caprice. Rather, it is a consequence of
the ultimate instability of the substantive content of the ground of our
language.
In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed, "The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.''2 We can now understand the
nature of this experience-it is no less than the ongoing process by which
humanity continually defines itself-the experience that is language. Moreover, we can now understand that the deep function of the judicial process
is the struggle over the particular norms-the ideology-that will be embedded in the ground of our language.
III.

PERFORMNG TIM CONSTITUTION

To this point, I have argued that texts have no intrinsic meaning and
that the meaning which we bring to texts not only fails to converge toward
stability but also can change, even radically, over time. Yet, I have proposed

118. Cf. PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY CRrTciSM ix (2d ed. 1983).
119. HoRwrrz, supra note 91.
120. FISH, DOING WHAT Co,,sM NATURALLY, supra note 71, at 139.
121. OLIVER WEELL HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMoN LAW 5 (Mark Howe ed., 1963).
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that we accept the Constitution as any other text, particularly that we treat
it as if it were the text of a play-a performance document. In this view,
constitutional meaning would be the product of the judicial process carried
out as a sophisticated kind of performance in which judges and counsel
share the roles of directors and actors, and the parties to the disputes and
the citizenry make up the audience.
How can we, however, "perform the Constitution" and yet remain
faithful to the Rule of Law? The answer lies in understanding both the
particular conceptualization of the law embodied in the Rule of Law and
the particular values that underlie it. The common meaning of the Rule of
Law is formalist in nature-it posits law as a reified structure of coherent
principles and rules standing off from, and acting as a check on, public
and private social and political action that might threaten the integrity of
the system of individual liberties that is the core value in our political order.
Two principal values underlie this formalistic formulation of the Rule
of Law. The first is the pronounced human craving for determinate meaning.
We need determinate meaning because it is an aspect of order. We need
order because most of us, most of the time, in most matters, are risk averse.
This risk aversity generates the endemic problem of the human condition,
that we perceive ourselves as always poised on the brink of chaos. When
you read Borges's Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote, and then think
deeply about it, you begin to feel the familiar world slipping away. And'
this is not a comfortable feeling.
The second underlying value is integrity. If the law is to have a function
consistent with the strong constitutional principle of individual liberty, then
the law must function with as much autonomy as possible. Here, "autonomy" has two aspects. In one aspect, public officials charged with creating
and applying the law ought not do so for self-interested reasons. This is
the matter of autonomy from the caprice of those vested with formal
authority. In the other, individuals who acquire substantial economic and
social power ought not to be able to capture the law to serve their own
interests. This is the matter of the autonomy of each individual from the
power of others.
This essay has tried to demonstrate that we cannot fulfill the desire for
order that underlies the formalist formulation of the Rule of Law. We
cannot do so because we cannot generate a fixed structure of meaning
through language. Meaning is strongly determined by the particular ideology
embedded in the ground of language. Since no ideology is complete, the
substantive content of the ground will inevitably tend toward instability.
Worse, even if we were somehow to reduce constitutional meaning to a
formal structure, the Constitution would quickly become just as mute as
Chekhov's plays became when his widow succeeded in freezing them into
canonical performances.
Thus, the gist of my argument is for the recognition of the inevitable
condition of language. We can only produce texts that are indeterminate of
themselves. The only meaning they can have is the meaning that we bring
to them. No one-not the author, not the reader-can infuse a text with
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determinate, stable meaning without ultimately making it mute. This is not
so much a paradox as it is a tautology-as the ground of our language
inevitably changes, we must reinterpret prior texts if they are not to become
incapable of "speaking to us." We must perform the Constitution as prior
text to keep it from dying.
Even more to the point, we should not equate indeterminacy, particularly
the textual indeterminacy that this essay has described, with incoherence.
The simple fact is that we have always found coherent meaning in the
Constitution, and we have always done so, on a functional lever, by treating
the Framers as Stoppardians.1 22 On a deep, implicit, unacknowledged level,
we have always "performed the Constitution" because we have found no
other practicable way to infuse it with meaning.
Indeed, we betray that we do so-and not just with the Constitution
but with texts generally-through a splendid crystallized Freudian slip: How
many times have you been part of an exchange in which one person, having
come across an unidentified object-whether a natural object, an artifact,
or a text-shows it to the other and asks the commonplace question, "What
do you make of this?"
My argument, then, advocates that we do no more than come out of
the closet by acknowledging that we are all Stoppardians. As I have tried
to show, the judicial process is an argument over the ground of language.
Because what is at stake is what the particular value content of the ground
is to be, then this is an argument over politics at the most sophisticated
level. What is surprising is that this needs to be said. After all, it has been
some one hundred and fifty years since the trenchant observer Alexis de
Tocqueville pointed out that this is what the judicial process is all about.'2
What, then, of the other value underlying the Rule of Law, integrity?
At present, the Rule of Law as formalism compels us to hide behind such
rubrics as "original intent" and "original meaning." Textual performance,
however, can only be for the here and now-"meanng" can only "mean"
for the present. The Rule of Law as antiformalism recognizes that the goal
is to prevent some from using the law in order to establish and maintain
hegemony over the rest. At any one time, there will be a hierarchy of power
within society. Those with power will be able to maintain and institutionalize
their power to the extent that their values can be maintained in the ground
of our language-by generating a tyranny of ideology. And a powerful tool
for maintaining their values is a judicial process that freezes Constitutional
meaning into a canonical performance by not openly acknowledging that
the process is a contest over the ground of language.

122. See FIsH, Is THErE A TEXT?, supra note 68, at 370. Fish observed: "The final
question concerns the practical consequences of [Fish's] argument [about the nature of
interpretation]. Since it is primarily a literary argument, one wonders what implications it has
for the practice of literary criticism. The answer is, none whatsoever." Id.
123. "There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or
later turn into a judicial one." Atxxs DE TocQuEv u. , DEMOCRACY IN AmRICA 270 (J.P.
Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 12th ed. 1988) (1835).
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Under the realist conceptualization of the judicial process, a judge can
act with integrity when the values underlying her decision cohere with a
particular ideology that has standing in the language of an interpretive
community. The larger judicial process, however, lacks integrity if there is
a hegemony of one ideology. Integrity comes only from a heterogeneity of
ideologies. This is why the pluralism of values properly is a basic tenet of
our political order. The Rule of Law problem of autonomy is not solved
by seeking stability in meaning; rather, it is solved by seeking instability in
meaning. This is the best guarantee against a tyranny of ideology.
Jonathan Miller's concept of the afterlife of a play-"It seems to me
that it is precisely because subsequent performances of Shakespeare's plays
are interpretations, rather than copies, that they have survived"1 24-posits
that a text continues to bear meaning for the present only to the extent
that people in the present continue to reinterpret it. The concept of the
afterlife gives substance to our repeated use of the rubrics "the living law"
and "the living Constitution.""' It provides, as well, a way of achieving
in an imaginative way Thomas Jefferson's prescription for periodic revolution. 26 As Alpheus Mason would put it, the best that we can hope to do
is maintain heritage and heresy-deadening structure and terrifying chaosin creative tension.' 27
A core element of the medieval cosmology'was "the significance of

vision as a creative force and as a mode of human understanding."12 In
our modern Cartesian consciousness, the creative force of vision has receded,
overwhelmed by our understanding of vision as a tool of passive observation.

124. MILLER, supra note 16, at 55.
125. MICHAEL RomAm, A PROFILE OF JONATHAN MILLER 33 (1992) (quoting Jonathan

Miller). Miller observed:
A lot of the time, you see, people work very automatically-precedent seems to be
the only guide to subsequent performance. If this were the case, then all evolution
would come to a standstill. You simply have to allow for the fact that what Darwin
calls 'variation' is built into the very nature of reproduction. Things which have to
be reproduced in order to exist quite unavoidably start to vary from the prototypethey start to depart from the prototype. In biology the reason for that is that the
genetic material is unstable-it has a built-in tendency to generate mistakes. Now
some of those mistakes are fatal, and cause the death of the organism at a very
early stage before it even appears on the scene as a competitor. But the fact of such
instability is the raw material of change and adaptation to new circumstances. I
think something comparable happens in the arts, particularly the reproductive arts.
For something to have to be reproduced means that there is the unavoidable

possibility of it departing and drifting away from the prototype. It's an extremely
interesting business.
Id.
126. "I hold it, that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary
in the political world as storms in the physical." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRrrNrs OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 412,
413 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
127. See Alpheus T. Mason, To Be More Safe: America's Continuing Dilemma, 45 VA.
Q. Rav. 545, 553 (1969).
128. ERICKSON, supra note 95, at 27.
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The account of meaning that I am offering seeks to return the emphasis in
the reader's function to seeing the text creatively. We can limit the effects
of our inescapable blindness by a continual openness to insight.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

A rather clear aim of this essay has been to reject a formalistic approach
to constitutional meaning. More by implication, I have also sought to reject
two other views that are strongly urged in the current literature of legal
academia, both associated with Critical Legal Studies. I will caricaturize
one as Crit-Utopianism, which posits the development of a conflict-free
society as the goal of the law.' 29 The caricature for the other is Crit-Nihilism,
which understands the law as nothing more than the instrument of those
who wield the greater share of power in society. a0
The power of the Greek myths is in their compelling capture and
distillation of salient aspects of the human condition. One of these myths
tells us of Sisyphus, wicked king of Corinth, whom the gods punished by
consigning him to the lower world where his everlasting task was to roll a
large stone up a hill, which rolled back down just as he reached the
summit.'3 ' The Myth of Sisyphus embodies the account of meaning that
this essay advances. In order to have meaning, we must incorporate a set
of values into the ground of our language. Because we can never have a
perfect set of values, each set that we do adopt will ultimately fail. We
seek the Truth. Our fate in this quest, however, is Sisyphus's fate.
My version of the Myth of Sisyphus argues that the Crit-Utopians do
no more than tell us how terrific the view will be when we get to the top
of the hill. The Crit-Nihilists become discouraged with the task because of
its ultimate futility. And the Formalists insist that, if we can just perfect
our technique, we will reach the top. The ancient Greeks did not describe
Sisyphus's hill in any detail. My point is that we ought to look, because
what we really ought to be doing is enjoying the flowers that we find on
our way up.
I will leave you, gentle reader, with just one more example, a fragment
of French poetry:
Reine, Reine, gueux 6veille.

129. Cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) (goal of political action
is to develop social order in which there are no longer conflicts between desires of individuals
and those of society).
130. Cf. Mark V. Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, I MARXIST PERSPEC.
96 (1978) (describing law's facilitative, repressive, and ideological functions as instrumental to
those with power in societal heirarchy).
131. EBENEZER C. BREWER, DIcTioNARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 1039 (Centenary ed. rev'd
1981); Wxu±LAm SMrrH, EvRYMAN's SMALLER CLASSIcAL DICTIONARY 270 (E.H. Blakeney & J.
Warrington eds., 1958).
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Gomme A gaine, en horreur, taie.13 2
In English, this fragment says,
Queen, Queen, arouse the rabble
Who use their girdles, horrors, as pillow slips.
... Doesn't it?
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132. FRANgoIs CHAiLEs FERNAND D'ANTIN, MOTS D'HEURS: GOUSSE, RAMEs (THE D'ANMANuscRIPT) pt.II, no. 16 (unpaginated) (Luis d'Antin Van Rooten ed. & trans., 1967).

